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Abstract
Subjective performance evaluation is modeled as auditing without commitment.
A superior, who has to decide whether an where to audit the work done by a
subordinate, takes into account all interim information he has obtained in the
meantime. This invites workers to cover up and withhold information in order to
make an audit more diﬃcult and thus divert their superior from making one. We
show that this strategy usually raises the cost of setting work incentives, so that
incentives are softened. However, in some instances the opposite holds. When
worker’s on–the–job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions, work
incentives have to be softened in order improve the internal ﬂow of information.
JEL classiﬁcation: J41, D23.
Keywords: Principal–agent relationship, auditing without commitment, internal organiza-
tion, information transmission, inﬂuence activity.
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Subjektive Leistungsbeurteilung durch einen Vorgesetzten wird modelliert als
“Qualit¨ atspr¨ ufung ohne Selbstbindung”. Ein Vorgesetzter muß sich entscheiden,
ob und wo er eine Inspektion des Arbeitsergebnisses vornimmt; dabei wird er alle
Interim–Informationen ber¨ ucksichtigen, die er bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt erhalten
hat. Das hat zur Folge, daß die Untergebenen alle Informationen zur¨ uckhal-
ten und verwischen, die einen Verdacht erregen und daher eine Inspektion durch
den Vorgesetzten erleichtern k¨ onnten. Ihr Ziel ist es, die Anreize ihres Vorgeset-
zten so zu beeinﬂussen, daß dieser von einer Inspektion ganz absieht. Es zeigt
sich, daß diese Strategie meistens das Setzen von Leistungsanreizen erschwert,
so daß die innerbetrieblichen Anreize reduziert werden. Allerdings ist auch der
umgekehrte Fall denkbar. Wenn die Vor–Ort–Informationen des Arbeiters sehr
wertvoll f¨ ur unternehmerische Entscheidungen sind, dann werden die Leistungsan-
reize reduziert, um den innerbetrieblichen Informationsﬂuß zu verbessern.
21 Introduction
The evaluation of a worker poses diﬃcult problems. Since adequate ‘objective’ performance
indicators are rarely available most ﬁrms base their performance pay —wage raises, bonuses,
or promotions— on ‘subjective’ performance evaluations by the superiors. These have their
own problems, however. Superiors often lack the ability or the incentives to make and defend
fair appraisals. And workers try to inﬂuence their ratings in various ways, taking their best
advantage of the superiors’ problems in making the appraisals. One important inﬂuence
activity is the distortion of information.1 E. E. Lawler points out that “there may also be a
tendency for the subordinate to withhold negative information about performance in order
to look good during the performance appraisal. This can cloud the degree to which a valid
performance discussion takes place; and if the appraisal data are used for planning purposes,
such withholding of information can contribute to poor planning.” (Lawler, 1990 p.97).
This paper shows how workers can inﬂuence their appraisals by distorting information. It
points out that it is the subjectivity of the performance evaluation which makes it particularly
sensitive to information distortions, and thus tends to invite distortions. Such distortions take
place during the whole working period (not just during the appraisal talks) and can have far–
reaching consequences for a ﬁrm. The model captures both aspects mentioned by Lawler,
namely, that performance measurement gets more diﬃcult when workers distort information
and that information distortion can adversely aﬀect management’s knowledge base. It will
be shown that ﬁrms will often (but not always) respond by softening work incentives, since
this reduces workers’ incentives to distort information.
Before sketching our approach in general terms, consider an example. Suppose a ﬁrm
produces complex software for other companies, and there is a worker who deals with one of
its client ﬁrms. He has to install the software, adapt it to the client’s needs, and give support
and advice. After some time, the client encounters shortcomings of the software in certain
applications. The worker is afraid that this is due to mistakes he might have done during the
early installation phase. If he tries to ﬁx the problems now, other people in his own ﬁrm will
probably notice it and questions might arise. As an alternative, he can try to convince the
client that the software was not designed for these applications in the ﬁrst place. The client,
still unfamiliar with the new system, is a bit disappointed about the product, but accepts
the explanation. And the software ﬁrm will never learn that these problems have come up.
However, this information may be valuable to the software ﬁrm. If the software can still
be adapted to the client’s needs, the latter one would be more satisﬁed. If it cannot be
adapted, the software ﬁrm, having learned this, could try to develop a better product. Or, if
it has other compatible software on oﬀer, it could sell a second product to the client. In view
1Information distortion is a typical inﬂuence activity according to Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1992 p.600).
1of this, the software ﬁrm might change its internal policy and assure workers that they will
not be blamed for malfunctions that come up. However, if this goes too far workers will not
care about the correct installation and there will be many malfunctions that can be avoided,
since the only way to set incentives is to make workers responsible for their work. Hence,
workers’ tendency to make cover–ups makes it more diﬃcult to set incentives and to obtain
valuable information from them. The tradeoﬀ between incentives to work and incentives to
inform will play a central role in our model.2
We model a ﬁrm with two members, a manager (principal) and a worker (agent). The
worker exerts eﬀort in order to reduce the probability of making a mistake in his job. There
is a state of nature on which it depends where a mistake is most likely to occur, and the
worker has the choice of either informing the manager or dissipating this information at a
cost. Afterwards the manager decides whether to look for a mistake, at a cost, or not. If he
does, he has to decide where to look for a mistake. Clearly, the information about the state of
nature, besides possibly having an intrinsic value for the manager, is helpful in the evaluation
process since it tells where a mistake is most likely to be found. But this is precisely why
the worker wants to erase it: Dissipating the information raises the expected evaluation cost
of the manager, so that the latter may ﬁnd it too costly to evaluate. Information dissipation
is thus a powerful tool in the hands of workers: By tilting manager’s incentives to evaluate,
it may prevent an audit in the ﬁrst place, and without an accurate audit (i.e. some kind of
explanation) the worker cannot be blamed for anything.
This eﬀect, which can only occur under subjective performance evaluation, is likely to have
a broad and systematic impact on ratings and on the behavior of workers. Cover–ups and
the withholding of information are widely observed in practice and are surely more pervasive
than the outright falsiﬁcation of audit results, which would also be conceivable under objective
performance evaluation.3 In practice, there are innummerable instances of workers trying to
hide information about their work environment because they fear negative consequences if
their superiors are too well informed. They cover up traces that might stir suspicions about
2In a related paper, Levitt and Snyder (1997) consider a worker who observes an intermediate signal about
the success of his own eﬀort and may inform the principal about it. Since his success will ﬁnally become
public information (contractible), worker’s information may serve as an early warning in that model. For
example, a salesman may inform his superior that a customer will probably not buy, so that the superior
can either overtake the talks with this customer or decide to quit the talks right away. The pivotal (and
special) assumption by Levitt and Snyder is that this intervention erases the veriﬁable information about
worker’s success. Based on this assumption they ﬁnd a tradeoﬀ between incentives to work and incentives to
communicate. In contrast, our paper derives such a tradeoﬀ even if the ﬁrm cannot intervene at all, or if it
can intervene without aﬀecting the information about worker’s mistake.
3In the model we will assume that the result of an audit cannot be falsiﬁed. We also assume that there is
no recontracting (collusion).
2a potential misbehavior, they withhold information that would be useful for entrepreneurial
decisions just because this information might also give a hint where they have encountered
diﬃculties, and so on.
In this model, the subjective element of performance evaluation is in the manager’s deci-
sion to audit.4 Pivotal is the assumption that, if a worker cannot be blamed for having made
a mistake, it is impossible to say whether he has really been successful at work or just not
audited accurately. The manager is therefore unable to commit ex ante to make an audit,
but will decide on it during the course of events. His incentives to audit will be aﬀected by
all interim information which he obtains prior to his auditing decision. We will be particu-
larly interested in two pieces of interim information: Firstly, the manager privately observes
worker’s eﬀort and thus knows the chances of ﬁnding a mistake; secondly, if he learns the
state of nature, it tells him where to look for a mistake.5
Note that in our model the performance evaluation is partly objective and partly sub-
jective.6 It is not completely arbitrary, since we assume that an accurate audit is needed in
order to blame an unsuccessful worker and cut his wage. In reality, a superior cannot simply
rate his workers just by his personal impressions. He has to explain and justify the ratings to
a number of people, in particular to the appraisees themselves and sometimes even in courts;
see Lawler (1990). It is this need for providing evidence, applying accepted evaluation cri-
teria, and convincing people —i.e. the need for ‘veriﬁcation’— that is particularly costly to
him. It also creates an asymmetry: A good rating is cheaply granted, since the appraisee
will not demand explanation, while a bad rating has to be defended and supported by some
kind of evidence. The bias for good ratings implied by this asymmetry is widely observed
in practice. And since it is particularly the bad events which need to be backed by harder
information, workers have the incentive to make the access to information more diﬃcult.
The model shows that in many cases cover–up strategies raise the cost of setting incentives,
so that incentives are softened. However, it should be mentioned that the opposite case is
also conceivable, so that a ﬁrm may actually beneﬁt from worker’s information distortion.
4A suggested deﬁnition: A performance evaluation is subjective if, at a given work result, the manager has
some discretion on the evaluation result. Under subjectivity, distortions could also be due to personal feelings
of the manager towards a worker, leading to ‘favoritism’ in the sense of Prendergast and Topel (1997). In our
model, such personal preferences will play no role.
5The paper adds to an emerging literature on auditing without commitment. Khalil (1997) presents a
hidden information model in which the principal obtains interim information about worker’s performance.
Jost (1991, 1996) and Strausz (1997) consider moral hazard situations without interim information, since
worker’s eﬀort choice and principal’s auditing decision are made simultaneously. Ours is a moral hazard
model in which these decisions are made sequentially and interim information plays an important role.
6We postpone a more detailed discussion of our approach to subjective performance evaluation in light of
the theoretical and empirical literature to the ﬁnal section 5.
3This is due to a strategic eﬀect, since information distortion may enable the ﬁrm to induce
higher work eﬀorts by the pure threat to make an inspection (i.e. without having to carry out
this threat in equilibrium — recall that inspections are costly).7 However, the withholding of
pieces of information which might be useful for entrepreneurial decisions is always detrimental
to the ﬁrm’s interests.8
The model is introduced in section 2 and analyzed in section 3. All proofs are in the
Appendix. Section 4 provides an extension which highlights the worker’s role as an informa-
tion producer. Section 5 summarizes and also discusses our general approach to subjective
performance evaluation in light of the literature.
2 The Model
There are two members of a ﬁrm, a worker (agent) and an owner–manager of the ﬁrm (princi-
pal); both are risk–neutral. The worker can either be successful in his job or make a mistake;
the more eﬀort he exerts the higher is his probability p of making no mistake (he does not
observe whether a mistake realizes). We normalize by saying that p ∈ [0,1] is his eﬀort and
let C(p) denote his related disutility.9 Let C(0) = 0, C0 ≥ 0, C00 > 0, and C(p) deﬁned for
all p ∈ [0,1). If he makes a mistake his productivity is zero, otherwise the manager (i.e.
ﬁrm) gets a beneﬁt of b > C0(0). Worker’s eﬀort and manager’s proceeds and proﬁt are
noncontractible, so that an incentive contract has to be based on some other performance
indicator which will be introduced below.
The worker’s task consists of two aspects θ ∈ {A,B}, and there is a state of nature
s ∈ {sA,sB}. In state sA the work aspect A is the ‘critical’ one, which means that there is
a danger of making a mistake in that aspect (with probability 1 − p), while aspect B is not
in danger. Vice versa for state sB. Hence in state sθ there can only be a mistake in aspect θ
(i.e. there can be at most one mistake). The two states are ex ante equally probable. Figure
1 illustrates. The realization of s is not observed by the manager, but will leak through to
him unless the worker dissipates this information at a cost γ > 0.
7There is now some literature on situations where a ﬁrm would prefer to reduce its own information in
order to improve incentives; see for example Cr´ emer (1995), Kessler (1998), Maggi and Rodr´ ıguez–Clare
(1995), Aghion and Tirole (1997), and Mitusch (2000).
8In diﬀerent but related contexts, Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Mitusch and Strausz (1999) show that
a worker is reluctant to communicate information for fear that the information may lead to policy decisions
which are unfavorable to him. In contrast, in the present model the worker is indiﬀerent about the policy
decisions, but fears side–eﬀects of the information on the manager’s auditing decisions and thus on his own
standing.
9For example, C(p) = p/(1 − p) is equivalent to the assumption that an eﬀort e ≥ 0 leads to a no–mistake
probability p(e) = e/(1 + e) and a disutility of e.
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mistake in aspect A,
no mistake in aspect B
no mistake at all
no mistake in aspect A,
mistake in aspect B
no mistake at all
The worker’s eﬀort reduces the probability 1 − p of making a mistake in the critical aspect.
Figure 1: A task with two aspects, A and B
We assume that the manager’s impression of the worker is perfect and costless: He ob-
serves the eﬀort p. Thus, if he could be trusted, the best contract would simply ask him
to reward the worker according to his personal impression. However, he cannot be trusted;
he would always claim that the worker is lazy, in order to save on the wage bill. He must
therefore be required to ‘explain’ a bad rating. We assume that he can produce, at cost
k > 0, veriﬁable information about the occurance of mistake in each of the work aspects, A
or B. It costs 2k to investigate both aspects.
An inspection and the related expenditures are unobservable. This implies that not–
looking for a mistake cannot be distinguished (in courts) from not–ﬁnding a mistake. Con-
sequently, a contract cannot commit the manager to audit, and attention is focused on his
incentives to audit. Since he observes worker’s eﬀort, he knows the probability 1−p of there
being a mistake, and this helps him to decide whether to audit or not.
In practice, superiors often learn some details about their workers’ environments. For
example, he may notice where the worker has problems. This is captured by the assumption
that the manger will usually learn the state sθ before auditing. In that case he will only
inspect the critical work aspect, θ, if at all. However, a worker can sometimes manage to
hide such traces. This is captured by the assumption that he can hide sθ. If he does, the
manager must conclude that each work aspect contains a mistake with probability (1−p)/2,
i.e. his probability of ﬁnding a mistake at the ﬁrst inspection falls from (1 − p) to (1 − p)/2
5due to worker’s manipulation. This raises manager’s expected evaluation cost (as will be
seen), which is exactly why the worker may want to hide the information about the state of
nature. Figure 2 summarizes the timing of events.
Stage 1: A contract is signed.
Stage 2: A state of nature s ∈ {sA,sB} realizes, not yet observed by the manager.
Stage 3: The worker chooses an eﬀort p ∈ [0,1] which is observed by the manager. The
worker may hide the information about s at cost γ > 0, i.e. prevent it from leaking
through to the manager. Otherwise it now leaks through.
Stage 4: The manager may inspect each work aspect at cost k > 0.
Stage 5: Output accrues and wage is paid according to contract and evaluation result.
Figure 2: Timing of the model
The contractual wage will naturally depend on the following state variable:
σ =
(
l means: “a mistake has been proven to exist”
h means: “no mistake has been proven to exist”.
Note that the state of the indicator σ is a result of three factors: (i) worker’s eﬀort, i.e. the
probability of making no mistake, (ii) a random inﬂuence, i.e. the realization of a mistake,
and (iii) manager’s eﬀort in performance measurement, i.e. whether he searches for a mistake.
The contract space is further deﬁned by the following assumptions. First, both for realism
and simplicity we rule out message–dependent contracts. Such a contract would require a
written statement by the worker about the state of nature and set three diﬀerent wages,
(wh,wtrue
l ,wfalse
l ), depending on σ ∈ {l,h} and whether worker’s message is correct in case
σ = l (since a mistake reveals the state). However, the distinction between wtrue
l and wfalse
l is
useless if the worker does not observe sθ by himself, or if the distinction between a mistake in
aspect A and B is not reliable enough to be used in courts. The ﬁrst of these two assumptions
is theoretically safer and suﬃcient for most parts of the model; only section 4 requires the
second assumption which also appears to be the more realistic one.
Hence the contractual wage can only depend on σ. Next, we assume that the manager
commits to two wages (wl,wh). Alternatively, one could imagine a two–stage procedure in
which the manager will oﬀer to recontract to a safe wage at stage 4 when both parties know
p. If the manager could then make a take–it–or–leave–it oﬀer, he would in some cases be
better oﬀ than under commitment, since he could save the inspection cost. However, while
6it is standard to assume that the principal has all the bargaining power at stage 1, it is not
clear that he would have it at stage 4 as well. If the worker had all the bargaining power,
then the manager would in most cases be worse oﬀ than under commitment. Hence, it is not
self–evident what the ‘right’ assumption is. More importantly, most of our qualitative results
are robust to such variations.
The payoﬀs are as follows.
Worker’s utility = wσ − C(p) − dissipation cost (1)
where dissipation cost is γ if he dissipates and zero otherwise. The worker accepts a contract if
he gets a non–negative expected utility (his market alternative is normalized to zero). He can
be punished up to an amount W ≥ 0, transferable to the ﬁrm, so that wage payments have
to obey wσ ≥ −W.10 Since we will derive diﬀerent types of incentive contracts, we will be
interested how the feasibility and ranking of these contracts depend on worker’s transferable
wealth W. For example, assuming W = ∞ allows us to study what happens if the worker
can be required to pay even huge ﬁnes if accused for a mistake. Our leading case is W = 0,
however, which implies eﬃciency wages where rents are shifted to the worker; in this case
one would like to know what exactly hinges on the assumption that ﬁnes are ruled out.
The manager’s (i.e. ﬁrm’s) expected gross beneﬁt is bp for a given p. Therefore:
Manager’s expected utility = bp − E[wσ + evaluation cost] (2)
where evaluation cost is 2k if he inspects both work aspects, k if he inspects only one aspect,
and zero if he makes no inspection.
While p denotes the actual eﬀort choice by the worker, let capital P ∈ [0,1] denote the
level of incentives, i.e. the eﬀort which is to be induced by a contract. As a benchmark,
consider the ﬁrst–best contract. If the manager could be trusted one would avoid inspection
and require an eﬀort Pfb which is given by
b = C0(Pfb). (3)
10Expression (1) is the utility net of W. Note that, if the worker’s market alternative is initially some
positive wage ¯ w, then he gets this payment upfront and it follows that W ≥ ¯ w.
73 Analysis
3.1 The actions induced by a contract
3.1.1 The manager’s evaluation policy
At stage 4, the manager’s proﬁt from ﬁnding a mistake is (wh−wl), since his payment to the
worker will then be reduced by this amount. Clearly, if wh ≤ wl, he will not evaluate, and as
a consequence the worker will exert no eﬀort. In the following assume wh > wl.
Suppose the manager has learned sθ. Then he will ﬁnd a mistake with probability 1 − p
(in aspect θ), and the cost of inspection is k. Thus his expected proﬁt from evaluation is
(1 − p)(wh − wl) − k. He will not evaluate if this is non–positive (on the tie–breaking rule in
case of indiﬀerence see fn.14 below), which is equivalent to
p ≥
wh − wl − k
wh − wl
=: ϕ1. (4)
This is the no–evaluation condition for the case the manager is informed about s.11
Now suppose the worker has dissipated information about s. Then each aspect of the
task may contain a mistake with probability (1 − p)/2 from the manager’s point of view. If
he inspects one work aspect, he will then have to decide whether to inspect the other one as
well.
Lemma 1 If the manager cannot observe sθ, he will not evaluate at all if
p ≥
wh − wl − 1.5k
wh − wl + 0.5k
=: ϕ2. (5)
Otherwise he will make inspections until he has either found a mistake or inspected both
aspects.
Note that ϕ2 < ϕ1 for any given pair (wl,wh): By withholding the information, the worker
makes it more diﬃcult for the manager to ﬁnd a mistake, i.e. he raises his expected evaluation
cost. The smaller work eﬀort p = ϕ2 is then suﬃcient to render evaluation unattractive.12
11Throughout, we will assume that a mistake cannot be repaired. If the manager could reduce his loss by
an amount δ after ﬁnding a mistake, this would increase his incentive to evaluate and raise the critical ϕ1 to
δ+wh−wl−k
δ+wh−wl . The basic structure of the model is the same as long as δ is not too large.
12It is worth noting that Lemma 1 can be generalized to any number M of measurement points, as long
as there is at most one mistake in them. For any integer M ≥ 1, the general no–evaluation condition is
p ≥ ϕM :=
2(wh−wl)−(M+1)k
2(wh−wl)+(M−1)k. If p < ϕM the manager will evaluate until he has either found a mistake or
inspected all M points. The critical level ϕM is decreasing in M and k for any given (wl,wh).
8Note also that the higher the ‘wage spread’ w := wh − wl the stronger is the incentive
to evaluate and the higher is the critical ϕi both i = 1,2 that renders evaluation unattrac-
tive. (We will also write ϕi(w) with ϕ0
i > 0 .) Hence, the optimal contract will largely be
determined by the need to provide ex post evaluation incentives to the manager himself.13
3.1.2 The worker’s eﬀort choice and decision whether to dissipate information
At stage 3, the worker chooses an eﬀort p and decides whether to hide the information about
the state s or not. If the manager were committed to evaluate, the performance evaluation
would be ‘objective’ and there would be no reason to hide information. The worker’s expected
utility of exerting p would be pwh + (1 − p)wl − C(p). However, since the manager is not
committed, the worker has two alternatives which avoid inspection altogether: He can either
exert p ≥ ϕ1 or exert p ≥ ϕ2 and also dissipate information. Both strategies assure him the
high wage wh.
The number of relevant alternatives of the worker can be reduced by the following con-
siderations. Obviously, there is no reason to exert more than ϕ1; more precisely he satisﬁes
p ≤ max{ϕ1,0}. And if he dissipates information, then p ≤ max{ϕ2,0}.14 Moreover, recall
that by Lemma 1 an inspection is always perfect if it is made, i.e. the manager then ﬁnds
a mistake with certainty if there is one. As a consequence, from the worker’s point of view,
information dissipation is only useful in combination with the eﬀort p = max{ϕ2,0}, since it
would not make sense to hide sθ at an eﬀort and then induce inspection anyway by p < ϕ2.
The worker’s optimization problem therefore reduces to choosing the maximum from the
following set of utilities:
n
wh − C(max{ϕ1,0}), wh − C(max{ϕ2,0}) − γ, ˜ pwh + (1 − ˜ p)wl − C(˜ p)
o
(6)
where ˜ p := arg max
p∈[0,1]
pwh + (1 − p)wl − C(p). (7)
If the ﬁrst element of (6) is its maximum, the worker does not dissipate information and
exerts p = max{ϕ1,0}. If the third element is the maximum, he does not dissipate and
sets p = ˜ p.15 However, if the second element of (6) is its maximum, the worker dissipates
information at the cost γ and exerts p = max{ϕ2,0}.
13This is in line with other models on auditing without commitment, see fn.5.
14Recall our tie–breaking rule that the manager does not inspect when he is indiﬀerent. Suppose he would
make inspections with some probability. Then the worker can avoid inspection with certainty by exerting
p = ϕ1+ε resp. p = ϕ2+ε, for an arbitrarily small ε. Thus, introducing stochastic inspection strategies would
make no diﬀerence in this model.
15There is no need to impose the constraint p ≤ ϕ1 on the max–problem (7): If ˜ p > ϕ1 then the third
element of (6) is necessarily smaller than the ﬁrst one.
93.2 Contract design: Feasible and cost–minimal contracts
At stage 1 of the game the manager makes his choice of wl and wh. We will proceed as follows.
In this section we assume that he wants to induce a given desired eﬀort level P ∈ [0,1]. Since
there are several ways of inducing an eﬀort, we have to see which contracts can induce a given
P, and thus also which P are implementable at all. Then we will identify the cost–minimizing
contract for a given P. However, here we will conﬁne ourselves to the most interesting cases,
sometimes by referring to b already. This gives us a relevant part of the manager’s cost
function, which will then, in section 3.3, be related to his beneﬁt function bP in order to
determine the optimal strength of incentives and the optimal type of contract implied by it
(for a restricted range of parameters).
There are three potential contract–candidates that may induce a desired eﬀort P. One of
them is tailored such that ϕ1 = P. In order to induce the eﬀort p = ϕ1, the ﬁrst element of
(6) has to be its maximum. Such a contract shall be called AV because it ‘avoids’ inspections.
To satisfy ϕ1 ≡ P, (4) requires that
wAV
h − wAV
l = k/(1 − P). (8)
The second contract–candidate is tailored such that ϕ2 = P. In order to induce p = ϕ2,
the second element of (6) has to be its maximum. Such a contract shall be called AVD










The third contract–candidate is tailored such that P = ˜ p. In order to induce p = ˜ p, the
third element of (6) has to be its maximum. This contract shall be called AC because it
‘accepts’ inspections (induces it with certainty). To satisfy ˜ p ≡ P, (7) requires that
wAC
h − wAC
l = C0(P). (10)
A contract is called feasible for a given P if and only if it induces the right choice from
(6). Hence, there will be two more feasibility conditions for each contract, in addition to (8),
(9), resp. (10). P is called implementable if at least one contract is feasible for that P.
Before going on, let us interpret the three contract types. Under contracts AV and AVD
the worker aims at preventing inspections. He works just hard enough, and shows it, in order
to convince his manager that it is not worthwhile to look for mistakes. These contracts build
on the subjective element of evaluation. Contract AC, in contrast, induces inspection with
certainty. If it is feasible, the outcome is just the same as if the manager would be committed
10to evaluate. This contract is clearly of less interest to us, and we will see to get rid of it. In
order to see which contract the manager chooses we now have to analyze the feasibility of
contracts and, when more than two are feasible for a P, identify the cost–minimizing one.
Lemma 2 For any W ≥ 0 it holds:
1. For any given P: If both wh and wl are reduced by the same amount, the feasibilities of
all contracts are unaﬀected.
2. At any P, contract AV induces lower cost than any other feasible contract (AVD or
AC).
3. For small enough P, contract AV is feasible.
By statement 1, feasibility depends only on the wage spread, as given by either (8), (9), or
(10), for every P. Consequently, at a cost–minimizing contract, the ﬁrm reduces wl as far as
possible, until either the worker’s participation constraint or his wealth constraint wl ≥ −W
binds. By statement 2, for any given P the manager would prefer to use contract AV. We
will return to this. By statement 3, the preferred contract AV is indeed feasible for P close
enough to zero; the reason is that the worker can then assure himself the high wage by a
small eﬀort.
However, for larger P the feasibility structure of contracts can be quite complex and
irregular.16 Moreover, there is no clearcut dominance relationship between contracts AVD
and AC if both are feasible and AV is not. Assuming that the eﬀort cost function is ‘strongly
convex’ in the following sense (which implies C(1) = ∞) will help to simplify:
Assumption 1 C0(p)(1 − p)2 is non–decreasing, i.e. C00/C0 ≥ 2/(1 − p).
With this assumption, the following Propositions 1 to 3 on the feasibilities of the three
contract types can be obtained. We start by stating those on AV and AC. On ﬁrst reading
one may concentrate on the ﬁrst sentence of each proposition. Proposition 1 states that
contract AV is feasible if and only if P is small enough, i.e. below some critical PAV. Note
that this is a strengthening of statement 3 of Lemma 2. Proposition 2 states that contract
AC can only be feasible if P is large enough, i.e. larger than some critical PAC. The other
parts of the propositions are explained below.
16As an illustration, consider the linear eﬀort cost function C(p) = βp. Suppose γ = ∞ so that contract
AVD and the second element of (6) are irrelevant. If β ≤ 4k, then contract AV is feasible for all P ∈ (0,1].
However, if β > 4k, AV is feasible for P ≤ 1/2−
p
1/4 − k/β as well as for P ≥ 1/2+
p
1/4 − k/β. The reason
is that the wage spread of AV, k/(1 − P), is strongly convex. (Assumption 1, below, will assure that C(p) is
even stronger convex so that a reswitch cannot occur.) Note ﬁnally that with the linear C(p) = βp contract
AC is not feasible at all. Hence, if β > 4k, the eﬀort levels P ∈ (1/2 −
p
1/4 − k/β,1/2 +
p
1/4 − k/β) are
not implementable.
11Proposition 1 (AV–contracts) There is a critical PAV ∈ (0,1) such that contract AV is
feasible if and only if P ≤ PAV.
There is also a critical level of dissipation cost γ1 > 0, increasing in k, such that:
For γ > γ1, PAV is independent of γ and increasing in k, with (k,γ) → (∞,∞) ⇒ PAV → 1.
For γ ≤ γ1, PAV is independent of k and increasing in γ, with γ → 0 ⇒ PAV → 0.
The critical PAV is everywhere continuous in k and γ. Since it changes its nature at
γ = γ1, we denote by PAV(γ1) its level for γ ≥ γ1.
Proposition 2 (AC–contracts) There is a critical PAC ∈ [0,1) such that contract AC is
only feasible if P ≥ PAC. If γ = ∞, then P ∈ [PAC,1) is also suﬃcient for feasibility.
The critical PAC is independent of γ and increasing in k, with k → ∞ ⇒ PAC → 1. It
holds PAC < PAV(γ1).
PAC is also continuous. For a discussion of these results it is convenient to assume γ = ∞
which ensures that the third contract, AVD, and the whole issue of information dissipation
are absent.
3.2.1 The case of no information dissipation (γ = ∞)
By Proposition 2, γ = ∞ implies that contract AC is feasible for all P ∈ [PAC,1), and that
PAC < PAV, where PAV = PAV(γ1). Thus every P ∈ (0,1) is implementable, either by
contract AV or AC.
What causes the boundaries at PAV and PAC? Recall that manager’s evaluation incentives
are increasing in the wage spread w and decreasing in worker’s eﬀort p. If the wage spread
is relatively small, the worker will choose the eﬀort ϕ1(w) which avoids inspection. If w
increases, ϕ1(w) and worker’s eﬀort cost C(ϕ1(w)) increase with it. But with the strongly
convex eﬀort cost function the worker will give up at some critical wage spread, say at
ˆ w1. At that point manager’s evaluation incentives get so strong that it gets too costly for
the worker to prevent inspection. He therefore accepts being inspected — and losing the
high wage with probability 1 − p. As a consequence, he reduces his eﬀort drastically to
p = (C0)−1(w) < ϕ1(w). The critical PAV and PAC of the two contract types are given by
the critical wage spread, i.e. ˆ w1 = k/(1 − PAV) = C0(PAC) where PAV = PAV(γ1).
The critical PAV and PAC are increasing in k because the critical wage spread ˆ w1 is. The
latter is so because manager’s evaluation incentives are decreasing in k, hence a higher wage
spread is needed to induce evaluation (at any P). Then the worker ﬁnds it more attractive
to prevent inspection, and as a consequence the critical ˆ w1 increases.
12-
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Curve AV: Cost under contract AV, k/(1−P). Contract AV is feasible for P ≤ PAV = PAV(γ1).
Curve AC: Cost under contract AC, PC
0(P) + k. Contract AC is feasible for P ∈ [PAC,1),
but dominated by AV for P ∈ [PAC,PAV]. The dotted line is the ﬁrm’s gross beneﬁt, bP. In
this example, contract AC is never relevant because it would imply a negative proﬁt. (Contract
AVD is irrelevant since γ = ∞.) The optimal contract is type AV, and the optimal strength of
incentives is P
∗ = 1 −
p
k/b. Speciﬁcations: C(p) = p/(1 − p), k = 2, b = 16, W = 0, γ = ∞.
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Figure 3: Manager’s cost function when W = 0 and γ = ∞
Figure 3 illustrates the feasible ranges of the two contracts and the implied cost function
of the manager. Under contract AV the manager will pay the wage wAV
h = k/(1 − P) + wl
with certainty and bear no inspection cost (the ﬁgure assumes wl = W = 0). But this works
only for P ≤ PAV. For P > PAV, the manager will have to use contract AC. Under this
contract the worker will be evaluated with certainty so that the high wage wAC
h will only be
paid if he has not made a mistake, i.e. with probability P. On the other hand, the manager
has to pay the inspection cost and wAC
h can be quite high. The ﬁgure shows that contract
AC is already feasible before PAV (the dashed part) but more costly than AV. The proof of
statement 2 of Lemma 2 shows that costAC > costAV for all P where AC is feasible.
Note that in Figure 3 contract AC is not proﬁtable at all, since manager’s gross proﬁt bP
(the dotted line) is everywhere below its cost. This depends obviously on b, but also on k:
17As a more general example, suppose C(p) = p/(1 − p), which satisﬁes Assumption 1 with equality, and




4γ+1} for γ ≤ γ1.
Moreover, PAC = 1 − 1/(2k). Thus in Figure 3, PAV = 0.875 and PAC = 0.75.
13Remark 1 An increase of k drives out contract AC. If W = 0 and b = αk for any number
α > 0, then contract AC is unproﬁtable for all P ≥ PAC if k is suﬃciently large.
The ﬁrst statement is easily shown: P ≥ PAC implies costAC(P) > C(PAC). Since
C(P) is strongly convex and PAC is increasing in k (bounded only by 1), C(PAC) becomes
arbitrarily large as k is increased.18 In fact, k drives out contract AC very fast. The second
statement (shown in the Appendix) strengthens this for the case W = 0: Even if b is tied to
k by an arbitrary α, an increase of k still drives out contract AC. Remark 1 will allow us to
exclude the less interesting contract AC from consideration, by assuming that k is ‘suﬃciently
large’. At the same time this does not prevent us from assuming that b > αk for some α, if
W = 0.
3.2.2 The eﬀects of information dissipation on the feasibilities of contracts AV
and AVD (γ < ∞)
When discussing the case γ < ∞ we will disregard contract AC. Thus, according to Remark 1
we assume that k is suﬃciently large (where its lower bound also depends on b) and determine
manager’s cost function only by reference to contracts AV and AVD.
For γ < ∞ information dissipation comes into play. Consider ﬁrst what happens to
contract AV. By Proposition 1, once γ falls below γ1, the feasibility range of AV falls with
it, even vanishing as γ → 0. For γ < γ1, the critical PAV is that P where the worker starts
to substitute information dissipation eﬀorts for work eﬀorts, since the latter get increasingly
costly. When the switch occurs, work eﬀort falls drastically from ϕ1(k/(1 − P)) ≡ P to
ϕ2(k/(1 − P)) < P. Failure on the ﬁrm’s part to anticipate this strategy would lead to a
drastic loss of performance and eﬃciency.
For γ < ∞ contract AVD, which already presumes and induces dissipation, comes into
play. There is of course always a prohibitive level of dissipation cost, say γh, such that
contract AVD is not feasible at all if γ > γh. Once γ is below this γh, but still close to it,
several less interesting subcases may emerge (if γh > γ1) which could only be characterized
implicitly. However, for γ ≤ γ1 these subcases have disappeared and a more regular structure
of contracts obtains. Therefore we will focus on γ ≤ γ1. The following proposition states
that, if γ is suﬃciently low, contract AVD is always feasible for a range P ∈ (PAV,PAVD]:
Proposition 3 (AVD–contracts) If contract AVD is feasible at all, there is a critical
PAVD ∈ (0,1) such that it is only feasible for P ≤ PAVD. If γ ≤ γ1 and PAVD > PAV,
then contract AVD is feasible for all P ∈ (PAV,PAVD].
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Curve AV: The cost induced by contract AV, k/(1 − P). Contract AV is feasible for P ≤ PAV.
For γ ≥ γ1 = 3.75 the upper bound for AV would be given by PAV(γ1), see Figure 3. However,





Contract AVD is feasible for P ∈ (PAV,PAVD]. The dotted line is the ﬁrm’s gross beneﬁt, bP.
Contract AC (not shown) is never relevant because it would imply a negative proﬁt (see Figure
3). Point I is the optimal contract from Figure 3. Now the best AV–contract is point III. But
this is dominated by point II, the best AVD–contract, which is therefore the optimal contract,
and the optimal strength of incentives is P
∗ = 1 −
p
2k/b. Speciﬁcations as for Figure 3 except
that γ = 0.25.
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Figure 4: Firm’s cost function when W = 0 and γ is low.
The critical PAVD is increasing in k, with k → ∞ ⇒ PAVD → 1, and decreasing in γ,
with γ → 0 ⇒ PAVD(γ) > PAV(γ1).
The critical PAVD emerges for the same reason as the critical PAV in the case γ ≥ γ1:
For P > PAVD it does not pay any more for the worker to avoid inspection, since his eﬀort
cost C(P) + γ would be too high.
Note that it is possible that PAVD(γ1) < PAV(γ1).20 Contract AVD is then irrelevant for
γ smaller, but close to γ1. Although it is then feasible for some P ≤ PAV, these P can also,
and cheaper, be induced by contract AV. However, a decrease of γ simultaneously reduces
PAV and raises PAVD, by Propositions 1 and 3. At some γ > 0 contract AVD does become
relevant, i.e. PAVD(γ) > PAV(γ). And for very low γ, PAV(γ) approaches zero while PAVD(γ)
gets even larger than PAV(γ1).
19By fn.17 this example implies γ < γ1 = 3.75 and PAV = γ/(1 + γ) = 0.2. Moreover, PAVD = 0.934.
20One can show: If AVD is not feasible for γ > γ1, then PAVD(γ1) < PAV(γ1). Furthermore: The explicitly
solvable examples C(p) = p/(1 − p) and C(p) = p/(1 − p)
2 imply that AVD is not feasible for γ > γ1.
15Figure 4 illustrates the same example as Figure 3 (with another vertical scale) with the
exception that γ is now fairly low. The feasibility range of contract AV is sharply reduced,
since PAV has fallen from PAV(γ1) (compare Figure 3) to a much lower level. In contrast,
the relevant feasibility range (PAV,PAVD] of contract AVD is quite large.
3.3 Contract design: The optimal contract
Having (partly) identiﬁed feasible and cost–minimal contracts for given P, we now turn to the
optimal choice of incentives, which will be denoted by P∗, and the optimal type of contract
implied by it. The manager chooses P∗ in order to maximize the diﬀerence between his gross
beneﬁt bP and the lowest cost of inducing P. The latter depends on worker’s seizable wealth
W.21 We will ﬁrst analyze the case W = 0 and then discuss the eﬀects of an increase of W,
mainly focusing on the other extreme W = ∞.
Before going on we note that our incentive contracts are eﬃciency wage contracts if the
scope for ‘bonding’ is limited, i.e. if W is small. For any W and any contract type the ‘quality
of work’, i.e. the worker’s eﬀort and productivity, is increasing in the wage wh (while the low
wage wl is always reduced as far as possible). Thus, as in eﬃciency wage models, the wage
directly drives the quality of the work delivered. Moreover, if W = 0 the worker earns a rent
in the ﬁrm (proof in Appendix):
Remark 2 If W = 0, the worker earns a strictly positive rent in the ﬁrm at almost all
implementable P. The only exceptions might occur at (i) P = PAV if γ ≥ γ1 and (ii)
P = PAVD if contract AVD is used.
3.3.1 The case of limited liability (W = 0)
Start by dropping all restrictions mentioned on the parameters b, k, and γ (except that
they are strictly positive) and consider contract AV. With wl = W = 0, the manager faces
costAV = wh = k/(1−P). Cost is independent of worker’s eﬀort cost function C(p) since the
worker earns a rent. Expected proﬁt is therefore bP − k/(1 − P), which is maximized by
P = 1 −
p
k/b. (11)
The resulting proﬁt is non–negative if b ≥ 4k. Note that statement 2 of Lemma 2 says that
AV is cheaper than any other feasible contract, whether or not AV is itself feasible. Hence, if
(11) satisﬁes P ≤ PAV, it is the global optimum, since it cannot be better to induce P > PAV
21In contrast, W does not aﬀect the feasibility of any contract (by statement 1 of Lemma 2). As a conse-
quence, the critical PAV, PAC, PAVD, and γ1 of Propositions 1 to 3 are independent of W.
16under a more costly contract. Thus, for W = 0:
If b < 4k then P∗ = 0.
If b ≥ 4k and 1 −
p
k/b ≤ PAV then P∗ = 1 −
p
k/b under contract AV.
(12)
The conditions b ≥ 4k and 1−
p
k/b ≤ PAV are consistent if k and γ are suﬃciently large.22
In fact, if b = αk for any α > 0, then 1 −
p
k/b ≤ PAV(γ1) is satisﬁed for k suﬃciently
large, since Proposition 1 states that (k,γ) → (∞,∞) ⇒ PAV → 1. Thus, (12) describes two
relevant cases.
The result (11) is quite intuitive. The optimal strength of the incentives under contract
AV increases with the incremental proﬁts created by additional eﬀort (b) and decreases in
the inspection cost (k). If inspection cost increase, the worker will be safe from inspection at
a lower eﬀort level; to counteract this eﬀect and restore evaluation incentives of the manager
the wage would have to be increased. However, with the limited liability constraint binding,
worker’s rent would then also go up. Therefore it is not optimal to restore incentives in full;
one would rather save a bit on the wage bill.23
Let’s compare P, as given by (11), to the ﬁrst–best eﬀort given by (3). While the latter
is independent of k, the former is decreasing in k, and it holds that k ≥ b(1 − Pfb)2 ⇐⇒
P ≤ Pfb.24 Consider also worker’s rent under AV, wh −C(P): It is increasing in k, and it is
increasing in b if P < Pfb, but decreasing in b if P > Pfb.25 Obviously, if inspection cost are
small, i.e. k < b(1−Pfb)2, it pays for the ﬁrm to recoup part of the worker’s rent by eliciting
a high eﬀort.
Starting from a situation where (12) holds, consider an increase of b, a decrease of k, or a
decrease of γ. Clearly, when 1−
p
k/b ≤ PAV is violated just a bit, the manager will stay for
a while with contract AV at P∗ = PAV, since the alternative contracts are pronouncedly more
expensive. Only when b gets much higher, resp. k or γ much lower, he will ﬁnally switch to
another contract. What happens then? We conﬁne attention to the case that k is suﬃciently
22In our example (fn.17): 1 −
p
k/b ≤ PAV ⇐⇒
n
16k




. The ﬁrst condition
in the braces is consistent with b ≥ 4k since k ≥ 1/2. Thus, if the conditions in the braces are satisﬁed, then
we know that P
∗ = 1 −
p
k/b under AV, without having to investigate the other contracts.
23At the optimum, the eﬃciency wage is k/(1−P) =
√
bk and manager’s proﬁt is bP −k/(1−P) = b−2
√
bk.
24In our example (fn.17), P
fb = 1 −
p
1/b and therefore P
∗ ≤ P
fb ⇐⇒ k ≥ 1. Both cases are possible,
since any k ≥ 1/2 is admitted.





































0(P)] ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ P ≤ P
fb.
17large so that contract AC drops out.26 Note that by Remark 1 we can still have b > 4k or,
if we wish, b > 40k.
The eﬀects of information dissipation on the optimal contract Consider contract
AVD. Under that contract expected proﬁt is bP − (3 + P)k/[2(1 − P)], independent of C(p)
and γ. This expression is maximized by
P = 1 −
p
2k/b. (13)
Note that 1 −
p
2k/b ≤ PAVD holds if k is suﬃciently large (Proposition 3). The resulting
proﬁt is non–negative if b ≥ (7/2 + 2
√
3)k ≈ 7k. Optimal incentives under AVD, if given by
the interior solution (13), have the same general properties as those under AV (where in this
case P ≤ Pfb ⇐⇒ k ≥ b(1 − Pfb)2/2).
Comparing (13) and (11), one notes that incentives are always lower under AVD than
they would be under AV if the latter’s constraint were not binding. This is so because














This diﬀerence is positive and increasing in P and k. As information dissipation raises
manager’s expected inspection cost, a larger wage spread is needed to provide him with
evaluation incentives. With W = 0, this means that a higher ‘gross rent’ (before deducing γ)
has to be given to the worker. It is then preferrable to reduce incentives a bit compared to
the case without information dissipation.
We are now able to draw a more complete picture of the eﬀects of information dissipation.
Suppose that k is suﬃciently large, so that AC drops out and also 1−
p
k/b ≤ PAV(γ1) holds.
Consider a gradual decrease of the dissipation cost γ. By (12), all γ ≥ γ1 imply P∗ = 1−
p
k/b
under contract AV. Once γ falls short of γ1, PAV decreases with γ. At some γ < γ1 the
critical PAV hits 1 −
p
k/b. If, at that γ, contract AVD is already feasible for some interval
(PAV,PAVD] (see Proposition 3), and γ falls further, the manager will not immediately jump
to contract AVD. Instead, he will reduce incentives in order to avoid information dissipation,
i.e. he stays at P∗ = PAV under contract AV. However, under that policy incentives have
to be reduced more and more as γ decreases further. At some γ the manager will switch to
contract AVD (if b > 7k). At this point both the wage spread and the work incentives jump
26Under contract AC proﬁt would be bP − PC






∗) = b, which is independent of k and implies P
∗ < P
fb if C
000 ≥ 0, by (3).
18upward. Incentives jump from PAV to min{1 −
p
2k/b,PAVD}, however, not as high as they
were when γ was very high. As γ falls further optimal incentives will not respond any more.
Figure 4 above illustrates a situation shortly after the jump from PAV to 1 −
p
2k/b.
The vertical distance between the dotted bP–line and point II is just a bit larger than that
between the dotted line and point III. Thus, II is better than III. For a γ slightly higher than
the one chosen in the ﬁgure it would be the other way round; point III would be a bit more
to the right and optimal.
We can summarize the eﬀects of information dissipation as follows. If dissipation cost γ
is low, our above reasoning suggests that information dissipation makes it harder to set work
incentives.27 The manager softenes incentives either because he wants to avoid dissipation
or because he accepts dissipation and faces the problem that providing evaluation incentives
to himself becomes more expensive, which implies (for W = 0) that providing incentives to
the worker becomes more expensive. Dissipation will only be accepted if γ is very low, so
that avoiding dissipation would be too expensive in terms of foregone work incentives. When
dissipation is accepted, wage and incentives are freed from this constraint and therefore make
a pronounced upward jump.
3.3.2 The impact of the wealth constraint W
How robust are the results derived for W = 0 to changes of W? Consider the other extreme,
W = ∞, where manager’s expected cost is: costAV = C(P), costAVD = C(P) + γ, costAC =
C(P) + k. As before, conﬁne attention to the following experiments: (i) For γ = ∞, so that
AVD drops out, a gradual increase of b starting from zero. (ii) For k suﬃciently large, so
that AC drops out and (here) PAV(γ1) ≥ Pfb, a gradual decrease of γ starting from inﬁnity.
In both cases the manager starts with P∗ = Pfb under contract AV, without any eﬃciency
loss. Once Pfb > PAV, he will stay at P∗ = PAV for a while in order to avoid agency cost
of k resp. γ; incentives are then distorted. Finally he will switch: In experiment (i) to
contract AC with P∗ = Pfb, in experiment (ii) at some γ < γ1 to contract AVD with
P∗ = min{Pfb,PAVD}.
Hence, W = 0 and W = ∞ yield qualitatively the same results in these experiments. For
intermediate levels of W these patterns will still look similar, but the analysis would be more
involved, since for every contract one would have to determine the ranges where the wealth
constraint binds and where it doesn’t.
The main diﬀerence (in these experiments) is that W = ∞ always implies P∗ ≤ Pfb while
W = 0 may also imply P∗ > Pfb. Moreover, the ﬁrst–best incentives P∗ = Pfb are more
27This was demonstrated for the case PAV(γ1) ≥ 1 −
p
k/b. Although the statement is not generally true,
it seems to characterize the ‘regular’ case; see the discussion in section 3.4.
19likely for W = ∞ than for W = 0, since large ﬁnes can be levied on the worker (that W = ∞
implies almost always wl < 0 is just a corollary of the eﬃciency wage result for W = 0;
Remark 2). Eﬀectively, worker’s private wealth is used to provide evaluation incentives for
the manager. The more realistic case is that of limited liability, when evaluation incentives
for the manager have to be provided by raising worker’s wage. The worker then earns a rent,
and this leads to more ineﬃciency. Some other diﬀerences between the cases W = 0 and
W = ∞ will now be explored.
3.4 A possibility: Firms may prefer high inspection cost and may beneﬁt
from worker’s information dissipation
While the manager wishes the parameters b and W to be as large as possible, his preferences
concerning k and γ are not as clearcut. They will now be discussed.
What are the manager’s preferences about (k,γ) jointly? This is easy to answer for
W = ∞: He would then prefer γ = ∞ and his own inspection cost k to be either zero or large
enough to assure that PAV ≥ Pfb. If k = 0, contract AC is eﬃcient (and AV not feasible
at all).28 But if k is restricted to a positive range, then AV is the only eﬃcient contract. In
order to assure PAV ≥ Pfb Proposition 1 requires that k and γ are suﬃciently large. A high
k is beneﬁcial because it raises the wage spread that provides evaluation incentives under
AV, and this keeps up the worker’s incentives to deter evaluation. Note that it is costless for
the manager to increase the wage spread, since he can draw on the worker’s wealth.
If W = 0, the manager would also prefer γ = ∞, but his preferences concerning k are less
clearcut because the wage spread needed to provide evaluation incentives cannot be levied
on the worker any more. The manager would clearly prefer k to be zero or close to zero and
use contract AC. But if that is not possible his second best choice of k would be such that
1 −
p
k/b = PAV just holds, because his proﬁt function has a local maximum in k at that
point.29
Now suppose k is ﬁxed and large (so that AC drops out) and ask: What are the manager’s
preferences about the worker’s cost of information dissipation γ? Again this is easier to
answer for W = ∞, where costAV = C(P) and costAVD = C(P) + γ. For γ → 0 the cost
diﬀerrence vanishes, and AVD gets feasible for a larger range of eﬀort levels than AV, since
γ → 0 ⇒ PAVD(γ) > PAV(γ1) by Proposition 3.30 This is an advantage if high eﬀort levels
28However, we have always assumed that k > 0 and will continue to do so.
29To explain this: For small k the manager chooses an AC–contract (P
∗ > PAV) and proﬁt is decreasing in
k. As k increases, he switches at some point to P
∗ = PAV under AV, and as long as it is optimal to stay there
proﬁt is increasing in k, since PAV is. Once the interior AV–contract gets optimal, P
∗ = 1 −
p
k/b ≤ PAV,
proﬁt is again decreasing in k. In our example (fn.17), P
∗ = PAV ⇐⇒ k =
3 p
1/(16b).
30In the example of Figure 4: PAV(γ1) = 0.875 and PAVD(γ = 0) = 0.936.
20are desired, i.e. if b is high, i.e. if Pfb is high. Indeed, if Pfb > PAV(γ1), then there exists a
¯ γ ∈ (0,γ1) such that the manager strictly prefers all γ < ¯ γ to all γ ≥ γ1.
The intuition is that worker’s information dissipation raises manager’s expected evaluation
cost and thus has a similar eﬀect as an increase of the inspection cost parameter k, which
is generally desired when W = ∞. It is therefore possible that a ﬁrm beneﬁts from worker’s
information dissipation, because it allows to set stronger incentives. It would then prefer
dissipation cost to be as low as possible.31 Note, however, that in contrast to an increase of k
there is now a countereﬀect, since the worker has to be compensated for his dissipation eﬀort
under contract AVD when W = ∞.
For W = 0, it is far less probable that the manager proﬁts from information dissipation.
The reason is that his cost under AVD is then pronouncedly higher than that under AV, see
(14). Note that this cost diﬀerence is independent of γ, i.e. it does not at all vanish for γ → 0
(as is the case if W = ∞). Hence, b has to be very high if a low γ is to be desirable. For
moderate levels of b the manager would clearly suﬀer from information dissipation and prefer
γ to be high. We therefore conclude that this latter case is the ‘regular’ case.
4 Extension: Valuable on–the–job information
In modern ﬁrms obtaining workers’ on–the–job information is often very important for en-
trepreneurial decisions. How do work incentives under subjective performance evaluation
aﬀect a worker’s willingness to pass such information?
Suppose the worker observes sθ and the manager can make an additional non–contractible
proﬁt π ≥ 0 if he learns it.32 Thus the value of this information is π. Two opposed cases
have to be distinguished. First, suppose the additional proﬁt π can be made after stage 4,
the evaluation stage. Then, if the worker has dissipated information, there is an additional
incentive for the manager to make an inspection, because ﬁnding a mistake in aspect θ will
reveal that s = sθ and enable the proﬁt π. In other words, inspections have a positive side–
eﬀect for the manager when the worker has dissipated the information.33 Then, for π high
enough, the worker will not dissipate information, but rather leave it intact in order to reduce
manager’s evaluation incentives. As a consequence the feasibility range of contract AV will
31Compare the literature cited in fn.7.
32This can easily be modeled: Suppose the manager can decide on a project or action as follows. In state
sA, a net gain of π can be made by taking an action aA, but a net loss greater than π will result if another
action aB is taken. Vice versa for state sB. Then he will only carry out a project if he has been informed
about the state of nature.
33As a consequence, ϕ2 will raise to
π+w−1.5k
π+w+0.5k. This is similar to the situation, mentioned in fn.11, that a
mistake can be repaired after it has been found in an inspection. Then inspections also serve an extra purpose
for the manager.
21increase (weakly) and that of AVD will shrink (maybe even vanish).
However, suppose now that the proﬁt opportunity is gone at stage 4. It is only available at
stages 2 or 3. Then, making the proﬁt π hinges on the working of pure communication (cheap
talk) since the manager has no opportunity to ﬁnd out sθ by himself in time. Moreover, since
manager’s evaluation decision at stage 4 is then independent of π, the feasibility ranges of
contracts are unaﬀected by π. The worker is willing to inform his superior about sθ truthfully
at stage 2 if and only if it is not worthwhile for him to dissipate this information, i.e. iﬀ the
second element of (6) is not its maximum. Therefore, the manager will make the additional
proﬁt π under contracts AV or AC, but not under contract AVD which spoils communication.
We may therefore add π to the manager’s cost under contract AVD. In Figure 4, the AVD
curve shifts upwards by π. At some critical π the optimal contract would switch from point
II with P∗ = 1 −
p
2k/b to point III with P∗ = PAV. Although the latter contract provides
only very weak work incentives, it restores the worker’s willingness to pass his important
on–the–job information.
This suggests that the demand for softening work incentives may be due to an organi-
zational goal which is only losely connected to the worker’s original task. The critical π
where the jump away from AVD occurs marks a shift in the ﬁrm’s priorities concerning its
employee: If π is below the critical level, he is primarily regarded as a production worker
(AVD contract); if π is above it, he is primarily an information producer (P∗ = PAV).
5 Summary
In a principal–agent model with a low degree of veriﬁability a contract has been derived that
can be related to several stylized facts about subjective performance evaluation (SPE). We
used this model to show the tension between incentives to work and incentives to communicate
resp. cover–up under SPE. In this section we will ﬁrst discuss our approach to SPE in light of
the literature and then summarize our results on communication resp. information distortion.
Subjective performance evaluation We assumed that a performance appraisal depends
on the manager’s discretion but that it is not completely arbitrary, since the worker’s remu-
neration eventually depends on ‘veriﬁable’ information. In practice, superiors have to explain
and justify their appraisals to the workers, and sometimes even in courts, so that even SPE is
to some degree ‘objective’. One should think of the objective elements as some harder pieces
of evidence, like an incident that cannot be denied by the worker. A subjective element is
in the superior’s decision whether to collect such pieces of incriminating evidence and defend
them in the appraisal talks or not. In the model this is captured by the properties that the
manager has to make a costly audit if he wants to blame the worker, but that he cannot
22commit ex ante to make such an audit. Note that the purpose of an audit is to produce bad
information about worker’s performance.
Our approach to SPE diﬀers particularly from that of Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994)
who assume that SPE is an implicit contract based on reputation. In their model SPE it
always perfect if reputation works (and they discuss the conditions under which reputation
works). However, as Prendergast and Topel (1993) noted, this approach makes it hard to
model the particular distortions observed in practice which are due to subjectivity.34 We
therefore took the other extreme as a starting point and assumed that the manager cannot
be trusted at all. He must then be required to justify his ratings, and the focus shifts to the
cost of justiﬁcation and the decisions involved.
Prendergast and Topel (1997) provide a model that captures some eﬀects of subjectivity.
In their model ‘favoritism’ is a personal preference of the superior towards his subordinate
(altruism). In our model, in contrast, ‘favoritism’ is a prejudice of the superior about the
performance of his worker. If he has the impression that a worker is good, he will not even
bother to evaluate him accurately but rather give him a high ranking. On the other hand, if
a worker has a bad standing in the eyes of his superior he will be inspected with scrutiny and
may have to bear consequences. Thus, ‘good workers’ (the favorites) and ‘bad workers’ are
treated diﬀerently. Such unequal treatment is very common in practice and often leads to
conﬂicts and resentments on the part of the unfavored. In our simple model the latter kinds
of problems are assumed away since the superior’s impression of his worker is assumed to be
perfect (he observes the ‘objective’ eﬀort p) and the worker perfectly adapts his eﬀort to the
level (P) which makes him appear a ‘good’ worker.35
This model derives a nonlinear incentive scheme. The ﬁrm expects its worker to make
a certain ‘normal’ eﬀort (namely P). A worker cannot expect much reward if his eﬀort
exceeds that normal level, instead of just meeting it; however, if it falls short of it, he has
to be prepared to bear consequences. Such critical work standards seem to play a role in
SPE.36 In the model the punishment for not meeting the norm is admittedly a bit extreme,
34Milkovich and Wigdor (1991, p.55,66) in their survey of the psychological literature list the following
types of problems in performance ratings: leniency (a bias towards good ratings), restriction in range (or
compression of ratings), personal bias (or favoritism), unreliability of ratings, and halo. Our model addresses
some of these problems, as will be explained.
35In this summary we always refer to the contracts AV or AVD and disregard the less interesting contract
AC which warrants a diﬀerent interpretation.
36In the two ﬁrms investigated by Abraham and Medoﬀ (1980), workers are evaluated against some level
of performance deemed normal (“Expected Results” resp. “expected performance”). Milkovich and Wigdor
(1991 Fig.6-1) present a representative ‘sample merit grid’ with ﬁve rating levels. However, it seems that level
3 (“fully satisfactory”) is the critical norm an employee is expected to come up to. Most workers (70% ) just
meet that standard and the reward for meeting it is substantial (3–5% wage increase whereas almost no wage
increase is granted at rating levels 1 or 2; the rating levels 4 and 5 are associated with smaller steps in the
23since the wage (wl) is then zero or even negative.37 On the other hand, the punishment
will never be imposed in equilibrium, which is consistent with the fact that managers tend
to give top ratings to almost all employees (leniency and compression in ratings).38 The
ﬂat–ratings phenomenon is often attributed to the fact that managers have weak incentives
to make accurate appraisals, an explanation that conforms well to our model because the
critical work eﬀort which discourages inspection (ϕ1 resp. ϕ2) is a decreasing function of the
superior’s inspection cost (k).
Note, however, that the ﬂat–ratings phenomenon in itself need not indicate a problem,
according to our model (in contrast to a conventional view). If the threat of a bad rating is
still active, it may stimulate considerable eﬀort. We have seen that an SPE contract can even
implement the ﬁrst–best by pure threats. This happens when the ﬁrst–best eﬀort is not too
high and the worker is not protected by limitied liability. However, this strong result implies
that the worker has to pay large ﬁnes when blamed for a mistake. In the more realistic case
of limitied liability the SPE contract is an eﬃciency wage contract. It is then likely that the
ﬁrm will elicit an eﬀort which is diﬀerent from the ﬁrst–best, either too high or too low, so
that there is an ineﬃciency.
Information distortion The sensitivity of SPE to interim information opens the door
for distortions and inﬂuence activities. This paper has emphasized just one of the ensuing
problems, namely, that threatening workers with inspection, without committing oneself to
actually make them, tends to disturb internal communication. A worker’s primary aim is to
convince his manager that an inspection is a futile attempt — one way to achieve this is to
work hard and show it, but another way is to build defenses against inspections. Workers
tend to build up such defenses in various ways, they object being watched closely and learn
tricks and strategies to hide information from their superiors.
This paper has abstracted from the possibility that a worker could also try to actually
forge an inspection result, as well as from any form of collusion (recontracting). Its focus
is on a more subtle, and more pervasive, eﬀect of information manipulation. Superiors are
sensitive to any information that stirs suspicions about a possible mistake or misbehavior of a
wage increase).
37In more general terms, the model predicts that bad behavoir is rarely detected but, if it is, leads to strong
consequences. Landy and Farr (1980, p.80) note in their review of the empirical psychological literature:
“These ﬁndings ...suggest that unfavorable information may be less accurately perceived but given more
weight in the judgment process.” This ‘psychological’ fact may have the ‘economical’ reason that unfavorable
information will have to be defended in one way or another if it is to enter a report.
38See Abraham and Medoﬀ (1980) or Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988). In the above–mentioned ﬁve–level
‘sample merit grid’ of Milkovich and Wigdor (1991 Fig.6-1), 90% of all employees are rated at levels 3 or 4 so
that the ratings are compressed to two good rating levels.
24subordinate. For a worker, preventing such suspicions to arise is the best way of escaping an
accurate audit, and without an audit he cannot be blamed for anything. Hence, a worker has
a strong incentive to withhold any information that might stir suspicions. As a consequence,
a large portion of the information which is in principle available in a ﬁrm will be shielded away
from the higher ranks who have the authority to decide on both personell and entrepreneurial
matters.
The ﬁrst major eﬀect of information distortion is that it raises the cost of performance
appraisals. Usually (i.e. under plausible circumstances) this makes it more costly to set
work incentives. The second major eﬀect is that the whole organization may suﬀer when
the internal ﬂow of information is disturbed. The only way to avoid information dissipation
strategies or mitigate their consequences is to soften work incentives, i.e. reduce the ‘normal’
work standards. The model thus oﬀers another explanation for the prevalence of relatively
weak work incentives in organizations.
There are, however, some instances where a ﬁrm beneﬁts from worker’s information dis-
sipation, precisely because it allows to set stronger work incentives and still avoid the cost of
actual inspections. This is so because the bonus for avoiding a mistake induces a sequential
contest between the worker and the manager — where the manager can get the bonus by
detecting a mistake, and the worker is the Stackelberg leader by choosing a work eﬀort. If
the bonus is not too high, the worker will assure himself the bonus by exerting a deterringly
high eﬀort, so that the manager will not make an inspection. However, at some critical size of
the bonus the worker will drop this strategy for its high eﬀort cost. Information dissipation
makes it more diﬃcult for the manager to ﬁnd a mistake, putting him at a disadvantage
in this sequential contest. If the bonus is raised to restore manager’s evaluation incentives,
then worker’s incentive to choose the deterrence strategy increases strictly. From an ex ante
perspective this means that higher eﬀorts can be induced by the pure threat of inspection.
However, it also means that worker’s rent goes up, if he is wealth–constrained.
It is therefore conceivable that a ﬁrm may actually facilitate information dissipation by
its workers (compare the literature on strategic ignorance cited in fn.7). The ﬁrm will then
expect a high ‘normal’ eﬀort from its workers and set a high wage spread, i.e. announce strong
negative consequences for a bad rating. In practice it could follow the policy that one single
bad incident will foreclose promotion for a long time. However, several conditions have to be
met for such a strategy to be optimal, so that this case should generally be seen as atypical
(especially if the worker is wealth–constrained). One important condition would be that
worker’s on–the–job information is unimportant, so that his productive potential is conﬁned
to his own task. Once his qualities as an information producer become more important the
ﬁrm will once again try to prevent information dissipation and reduce work incentives in
25order to improve the internal ﬂow of information.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
The ﬁrst inspection (say at aspect A) reveals a mistake with probability 0.5(1 − p). If the
manager ﬁnds no mistake he updates the probability of ﬁnding one at the second inspection




1+p, compare Figure 1. Hence his payoﬀ from the second
inspection is
1−p
1+p(wh − wl) − k.
The payoﬀ from just one inspection is 0.5(1−p)(wh−wl)−k. However, if this is positive,
the second inspection is also proﬁtable, since
1−p
1+p > 0.5(1−p). Thus, if inspection is proﬁtable
at all, the manager will continue to evaluate. His payoﬀ from evaluation is (1−p)(wh−wl)−
0.5(1 − p)k − [1 − 0.5(1 − p)]2k (if there is a mistake it will eventually be found, and with
probability [1 − 0.5(1 − p)] there will be two inspections). This is positive iﬀ (5) holds.
Proof of Lemma 2
1. All feasibility conditions are linear in the wage spread w := wh − wl. This is clear for
(8)–(10). Also ϕ1 and ϕ2 depend only on the wage spread w, see (4) and (5). The expressions
in (6) are then also linear in w; just subtract wl from all of them.
2. For a given P, the manager’s expected cost is
costAV = wAV
h = k/(1 − P) + wAV
l
costAC = PwAC
h + (1 − P)wAC








By the ﬁrst statement of this lemma, wl will be reduced as far as possible.
Consider contract AV for a given P. If W ≥ k/(1−P)−C(P) the participation constraint
will be made binding by wAV
l = C(P)−k/(1−P), and costAV = C(p). In the other case the
wealth constraint will be made binding by wAV
l = −W, and costAV = k/(1 − P) − W.
Similar for AVD. If W ≥
(3+P)k





2(1−P) − W > C(P) + γ. Thus, in every case, costAV < costAVD.
Similar for AC. If W ≥ PC0(P)−C(P), then costAC = C(P)+k ≥ PC0(P)+k −W. In
the other case, costAC = PC0(P)+k −W ≥ C(P)+k. Feasibility of AC for P requires that
w = C0(P), by (10), and P < ϕ1(w), since otherwise the worker would prefer to exert ϕ1
(formally, the third element of (6) must exceed the ﬁrst one, which rewrites as (1 − P)w ≤
26C(max{ϕ1(w),0}) − C(P), and C is increasing). Thus feasibility requires ϕ−1
1 (P) < w,
equivalent to k/(1 − P) < C0(P), equivalent to k/(1 − P) − W < PC0(P) + k − W. Thus,
whenever AC is feasible, then costAV < costAC. 3. is trivial.
Proof of Proposition 1 (AV–contracts)
Contract AV is feasible for a wage spread w := wh − wl if and only if the ﬁrst element of (6)
weakly exceeds the others at that w. This yields two feasibility conditions which can then be
translated into conditions in terms of P by use of (8).
Assumption 1 will mainly be used to sign the following derivatives: For i = 1,2,
dC(ϕi(w))/dw = C0(ϕi(w))ϕ0
i(w) = C0(ϕi(w))(1 − ϕi(w))2/(ki) > 0. (15)
First condition: The ﬁrst element of (6) weakly exceeds the third one. By (6),
the worker prefers max{ϕ1(w),0} over ˜ p(w) if and only if
0 ≤ (1 − ˜ p(w))w + C(˜ p(w)) − C(max{ϕ1(w),0}) =: Ψ1(w). (16)
One shows, using (15), that Ψ1(w) is concave, Ψ1(0) = 0, Ψ1(k) > 0, and Ψ1(∞) < 0. Hence
the condition ‘Ψ1( ˆ w1) = 0 and ˆ w1 > 0’ yields exactly one ˆ w1 > k, and (16) is satisﬁed for
all w ≤ ˆ w1. This is equivalent to P ≤ ϕ1( ˆ w1) = 1 − k/ ˆ w1 =: ˆ P1. Below we will see that
ˆ P1 = PAV for γ ≥ γ1. Note that ˆ P1 is independent of γ. By diﬀerentiation of Ψ1( ˆ w1) ≡ 0
one shows that ∂ ˆ w1
∂k > ˆ w1
k ; use (1 − ϕ1( ˆ w1))2/k = k/ ˆ w2
1. Hence ˆ P1 is increasing in k. To see
that k → ∞ ⇒ ˆ P1 → ∞: (16) implies C(˜ p( ˆ w1)) − C( ˆ P1) < 0, and the property follows from
ˆ w1 > k and w → ∞ ⇒ ˜ p(w) → 1.
Second condition: The ﬁrst element of (6) weakly exceeds the second one. By
(6), the worker prefers max{ϕ1(w),0} over max{ϕ2(w),0} if and only if
γ ≥ C(max{ϕ1(w),0}) − C(max{ϕ2(w),0}) =: Ω(w). (17)
One shows, using (15), that Ω(w) is zero for w ≤ k and strictly increasing (its derivative
bounded away from zero) for w > k. Hence there exists a critical ¯ w > k such that condition
(17) is satisﬁed if and only if w ≤ ¯ w. This is equivalent to P ≤ ϕ1( ¯ w) = 1 − k/ ¯ w =: ¯ P1.
Below we will see that ¯ P1 = PAV for γ < γ1. Since ¯ w is increasing in γ (by diﬀerentiation of
Ω( ¯ w) ≡ γ) with limγ→0 ¯ w = k, it follows that ¯ P1 is increasing in γ with γ → 0 ⇒ ¯ P1 → 0.





3− ¯ P1 ,0
o
= γ. Hence ¯ P1
is independent of k.
27Necessary and suﬃcient condition. We have thus shown that the necessary and suﬃ-
cient feasibility condition of contract AV is P ≤ min{ ˆ P1, ¯ P1} =: PAV. The critical γ1 is given
by γ1 := Ω( ˆ w1), so that γ < γ1 ⇐⇒ ¯ w < ˆ w1 ⇐⇒ ¯ P1 < ˆ P1. Since Ω(w) and ˆ w1(k) are
increasing functions, so is γ1(k).
Proof of Proposition 2 (AC–contracts)
This proposition is a byproduct of the proof of Proposition 1 (‘First condition’). There
we have shown that the ﬁrst element of (6) exceeds the third one if and only if w ≤ ˆ w1.
Hence, a necessary feasibility condition for contract AC is w ≥ ˆ w1. For γ = ∞ this is also
suﬃcient. From (10), w ≥ ˆ w1 is equivalent to C0(P) ≥ ˆ w1, i.e. P ≥ ˜ p( ˆ w1) =: PAC. Since
ˆ w1 is independent of γ, so is PAC. Since ˆ w1(k) and ˜ p( ˆ w1) are increasing functions, PAC is
increasing in k. In the proof of Proposition 1 we have shown that k → ∞ implies ˜ p( ˆ w1) → 1,
i.e. PAC → 1. We have also seen that C(˜ p( ˆ w1)) − C( ˆ P1) < 0. Since C is increasing and
ˆ P1 = PAV for γ ≥ γ1, this implies PAC < PAV(γ1).
Proof of Remark 1
For W = 0 manager’s proﬁt under AC is bP − PC0(P) − k < P[b − C0(P)]. This is negative
for all P ≥ PAC if b − C0(PAC) < 0.
For k not too small it holds PAC ≡ ˜ p( ˆ w1) = (C0)−1( ˆ w1) > 0; see proof of Proposition
2. Using this and b = αk: b − C0(PAC) = αk − ˆ w1. The proof of Proposition 1 (‘First
condition’) showed that ∂ ˆ w1
∂k > ˆ w1
k . Therefore ˆ w1 grows in k and will exceed αk, for any α.
Hence b − C0(PAC) becomes negative for k suﬃciently large.
Proof of Proposition 3 (AVD–contracts)
First condition: The second element of (6) weakly exceeds the third one. By (6),
the worker prefers max{ϕ2(w),0} over ˜ p(w) if and only if
γ ≤ (1 − ˜ p(w))w + C(˜ p(w)) − C(max{ϕ2(w),0}) = Ψ2(w). (18)
One shows, using (15), that Ψ2(w) is concave, Ψ2(0) = 0, Ψ2(1.5k) > 0, and Ψ2(∞) < 0.
Denote γh := argmaxw Ψ2(w). If γ > γh, condition (18) cannot be satisﬁed for any w. If
γ ≤ γh, such that (18) holds for some w, then there exists a unique ˆ w2 > 1.5k such that
(18) is violated for all w > ˆ w2. This yields the necessary feasibility condition: γ ≤ γh
and P ≤ ϕ2( ˆ w2) =: PAVD. By diﬀerentiations of Ψ2( ˆ w2) ≡ γ (for γ ≤ γh), one shows
that ˆ w2 is decreasing in γ and that ∂ ˆ w2
∂k > ˆ w2
k ; use (1 − ϕ2( ˆ w2))2/(2k) = 2k/( ˆ w2 + 0.5k)2.





∂k − ˆ w2
k
i
> 0. As (16) and (18)
imply Ψ2(w) > Ψ1(w) it follows: γ → 0 ⇒ ˆ w2 > ˆ w1 ⇒ PAVD(γ) > PAV(γ1). To see that
k → ∞ ⇒ PAVD → ∞, proceed similar as in the proof of Proposition 1 (‘First condition’).
Second condition: The second element of (6) weakly exceeds the ﬁrst one. In the
proof of Proposition 1 (‘Second condition’) we have shown that this condition is equivalent
to Ω(w) ≥ γ, which is equivalent to w ≥ ¯ w. Deﬁning ¯ P2 := ϕ2( ¯ w) this translates into the
necessary condition P ≥ ¯ P2 for contract AVD.
Necessary and suﬃcient condition in terms of P when γ ≤ γ1. The necessary and
suﬃcient feasibility conditions for AVD are: Ψ2(w) ≥ γ and Ω(w) ≥ γ. The latter is condition
is equivalent to w ≥ ¯ w. But w ≤ ˆ w2 is only necessary for Ψ2(w) ≥ γ. We want to show that
γ ≤ γ1 implies: (i) ¯ w ≤ ˆ w2 and (ii) AVD is feasible if and only if w ∈ [ ¯ w, ˆ w2].
Generally Ψ2(w) ≡ Ψ1(w) + Ω(w), by the deﬁnitions of these functions. This implies
Ψ2( ˆ w1) = 0 + γ1 ≥ γ, since Ψ1( ˆ w1) = 0 by deﬁnition of ˆ w1, γ1 := Ω( ˆ w1), and we assume
γ ≤ γ1. But Ψ2( ˆ w1) ≥ γ implies ˆ w1 ≤ ˆ w2, and since γ ≤ γ1 implies ¯ w ≤ ˆ w1, we conclude that
¯ w ≤ ˆ w2. This is (i). Moreover, Ψ2( ¯ w) = Ψ1( ¯ w)+γ ≥ γ, since Ω( ¯ w) = γ is just the deﬁnition
of ¯ w and Ψ1( ¯ w) ≥ 0 is implied by ¯ w ≤ ˆ w1. But Ψ2( ¯ w) ≥ γ implies that Ψ2(w) ≥ γ holds for
all w ∈ [ ¯ w, ˆ w2], since Ψ2(w) is humpshaped and cuts γ from above at ˆ w2. This is (ii).
Hence, AVD is feasible for γ ≤ γ1 if and only if w ∈ [ ¯ w, ˆ w2] (non–empty), which is
equivalent to P ∈ [ ¯ P2,PAVD]. Note that γ ≤ γ1 implies PAV = ¯ P1 = ϕ1( ¯ w) > ϕ2( ¯ w) = ¯ P2.
By Proposition 1 and the above, γ → 0 ⇒ PAVD > PAV.
Proof of Remark 2
Since W = 0 implies wh = w, we obtain (using deﬁnitions (16) and (18) for AV resp. AVD):
Worker’s rentAV = w − C(ϕ1(w)) = Ψ1(w) + ˜ p(w)w − C(˜ p(w)).
Worker’s rentAVD = w − C(ϕ2(w)) − γ = Ψ2(w) + ˜ p(w)w − C(˜ p(w)).
Worker’s rentAC = ˜ p(w)w − C(˜ p(w)), where ˜ p(w) ≡ P > 0.
Since ˜ p(w) is the maximizer of worker’s concave payoﬀ pw−C(p), the term ˜ p(w)w−C(˜ p(w)) is
non–negative, and strictly positive if ˜ p(w) > 0. The proof of Propositions 1 (‘First condition’)
showed that Ψ1(w) ≥ 0 is a feasibility condition of AV and that under AV: P ∈ (0,PAV) ⇒
Ψ1(w) > 0 (for γ < γ1 this holds even at P = PAV). Similar for AVD.
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